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Recent events in the United States have generated considerable discussion about 
dealing with emergencies. Such discussion has produced congressional 
investigations and governmental reorganization while blaming victims for their own 
ineptness. Much of that discussion misses the point. Every community shows 
evidence of past problem solving and many of those problems were considered 
emergencies. Everywhere, people solve their problems within their own social and 
cultural context. Cities that experienced traumatic damage in World War II – 
London, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Tokyo – are still vibrant communities.1  
San Francisco recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of the 1906 earthquake.  
Some celebrated the city’s continuity but others predicted a dangerous future. We 
easily recall the disasters but forget the continuity and creativity of these 
communities. 
When new threats appear, they are usually seen as more deadly and more 
disorganizing than those that have come before. On the other hand, we often miss 
the effectiveness of individual communities in addressing these threats. In 1995, 
when the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed by domestic terrorists, the 
city was home to a population of 450,000 and had fifteen hospitals. Within ninety 
seconds after the blast, emergency medical services had seven ambulances and two 
supervisory vehicles en route to the scene. The final report indicated that by 9:45 
a.m., there were more medical personnel, drivers and people wanting to help than 
the site could handle. By 10:30 a.m. there were 442 people treated at various 
emergency rooms, eighty-three hospitalized and 243 treated by private physicians; 
all live victims, with perhaps two exceptions, had been removed from the damaged 
building. This effort – centering on a bomb-destroyed building – involved 167 deaths 
and 675 non-fatal injuries. The unanticipated emergency response from the 
community dealt with the immediate injuries in a little more than an hour.2   
Of course, the central symbol of international terrorism in the United States was 
the collapse of the World Trade Towers in New York and the perhaps 3,000 deaths 
that resulted from the collapse. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that at the 
time of impact there were an estimated 17,400 occupants in those buildings and 
eighty-seven percent of them evacuated successfully. Most of the deaths were on the 
floors or above the floors where the planes hit. It is now determined that ninety-nine 
percent of those below the impact floors successfully evacuated.3 This successful 
evacuation was not accomplished by conventional search and rescue groups; it was 
the result of people on site helping others and themselves to take protective action to 
get out of the towers and to a safe location. While the loss of property and life 
occurring on 9/11 is frequently recalled, the protective actions of the other “victims” 
in the building are often overlooked. 
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Much of the contemporary discussion about emergency planning assumes that 
community members “panic” and that strong authority is necessary. The vocabulary 
of “command and control” suggests chaos rather than citizen adaptability and 
creativity. Such assumptions can be questioned by the research evidence 
accumulated in recent years.4 While we calculate damage to physical and human 
capital, we usually ignore the social capital available within communities to deal with 
emergencies. Social capital is our most significant resource in responding to damage 
caused by natural and other hazards, such as terrorism. 
 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CAPITAL 
Insight into the ways in which communities respond to emergencies can be found by 
looking at the types of capital used to construct the human community. Most obvious 
is physical capital. We have tools and materials to build houses and streets, string 
wires or go wireless, build 110-story towers and create the material environment we 
experience every day. Also obvious is the necessary human capital. We build schools 
and colleges, as well as clinics and hospitals, to provide people with skills, 
knowledge, and health care. The concern for human capital is obvious. We want to 
improve it, not lose it, so we develop programs to improve test scores, increase stays 
in school, improve nutrition, and prevent diseases.   
Most recently, attention has been given to another kind of capital: social capital.  
Social capital is not located in individual people, as is human capital, but rather is 
embedded in social relationships and networks between and among members of a 
community. These relationships can be used to guide collective action in emergency 
situations. In other words, even with losses to physical and human capital, social 
capital is less affected, can be quickly repaired, and provides an essential resource in 
accomplishing critical tasks. 
The concept of social capital has been used in different ways.  This discussion is 
based on the work of James Coleman, who identifies six different forms of social 
capital: obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective 
sanctions, authority relations, appropriable social organizations, and intentional 
organizations.5 
Obligations and Expectations. Living within a community creates a network of 
obligations – to other family members and kin, to neighbors, workmates, other 
members of religious and social groups, and to unknown members of the 
community. Within this context, we develop trust that our obligations will be repaid 
when we need help. Over time, we build up many obligations that serve as an 
indication of the interconnectedness of our social world. These types of 
interconnectedness increase the resources available to all individuals involved in 
those relationships when a need presents itself. These obligations and expectations 
are rarely visible to “outsiders;” in fact, they may be difficult to articulate even for the 
people included in such networks.  But they represent resources that will become 
available when the need is apparent and action is necessary. 
Informational Potential. Information is important as the basis for action – what 
needs to be done. With sudden and unexpected changes, information can be 
obtained by using social relationships maintained for other purposes. While the 
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media has been given heightened importance in the modern world, individuals – by 
interacting with other informed members of the community – can increase their 
knowledge without having to obtain that information directly. In addition, while the 
media might provide “general” information, the specific implications for an 
individual have to be tailor-made. People talk to one another.   
Norms and Effective Sanctions. The communication of a “declaration” of an 
emergency signals that self-interested behavior needs to be subjugated to the 
interests of the community. Norms defining what needs to be done and what should 
not be done organize action. They facilitate some actions and constrain others. 
Authority Relations. When groups are organized to pursue specific goals, a leader 
is often chosen to make decisions and speak for that group. This leader has access to 
an extensive network of capital that amplifies the social capital of individual 
members. Such a leader can “volunteer” the network to engage in specific tasks.  
Volunteering is never an isolated act, but rather the action of some people involved 
in several other networks.   
Appropriable Social Organizations. One outcome of social life is the creation of 
organizations for specific purposes. Most organizations, however, can be used for 
purposes other than those for which they were initially intended. A school intended 
to educate can be used as a first aid station, a shelter, or a coordination center, 
staffed by school personnel (including current students). A house of worship can be 
used in similar ways. Such reallocation of organizational effort provides flexibility to 
cope with unexpected problems. Routine activities can always be suspended for more 
urgent problems. This allows a community to reallocate its efforts and to utilize its 
physical and human capital in different ways. 
Intentional Organizations. As human communities have added complexity, 
organizations engaged in recurrent activities of continuing value have emerged, each 
with its own history. Fire departments, police departments, emergency medical 
services, sanitation departments, traffic and parking have become routine and 
expected community services. Most recently, some political units (from local to 
national) have begun to think of emergency management as a routine community 
function. This has led to the development of specialized training and the emergence 
of a new occupation and career path. Such innovations point to another source of 
social capital now available to deal with emergencies. 
 
The discussion here will focus on the community as the social system, within what 
are called developed societies, especially the United States. (Developing societies 
present a series of different issues, which will not be discussed here.) In part, the 
emphasis on developed societies is dictated by the scope of existing research 
available for analysis. Further, the focus will be on the response phase. It has become 
conventional to categorize disaster along a time spectrum – preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. The most difficult part of the spectrum to study is 
response, primarily because this phase is short and often unexpected. This makes 
response difficult for “planned” research. Much of the research on response has been 
opportunistic and lacking in the cumulative continuity necessary to develop 
generalizations. Also, some “response” research is done months and years after the 
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event, which raises questions about the nature of recall and, perhaps more 
importantly, misses the emergent qualities of the response. 
The most systematic research on disaster response in the United States was 
initiated at the Disaster Research Center (DRC) in the late 1960s, where field teams 
were able to research a number of different communities.6 Much of that research has 
been reported and published. In Organized Behavior in Disaster, conceptualizations 
from that fieldwork are recorded, in terms of the theoretical ideas that guided the 
research at that time.7 Here, those materials are used as the basis for 
reconceptualization in terms of social capital. In addition, comments will be added 
from other studies of disaster response that illuminate this concept.   
From the earlier research, the concept of emergence seems particularly important. 
The original DRC research design was predicated on a Time I/Time II comparison of 
changes in community structure. It soon became apparent that certain critically 
important elements in the response had no pre-response existence: the phenomenon 
called emergence. As Thomas Drabek suggests in a later summary article: 
What is it that makes an appearance? Within the literature, the two general 
categories of social phenomena have been described – behavior and 
expectations.  In short, what emerges is a sequence of patterned behaviors – a 
social structure. These behaviors...may form relatively simple social systems.8  
 Here emergence is seen as the creation of new social capital. In many instances it 
emerges from existing social capital, but at other times it is “new” in that it is created 
to meet new problems created by the disaster. This view is contrary to most media 
accounts of disaster, which portray community structure as fragile and unable to 
deal with disaster problems, often implicitly suggesting that “survival” is dependent 
on external aid. As Coleman points out in an earlier and different context: 
It may seem paradoxical that problems create community organization, but 
such is nevertheless the case. A community without common problems, as 
many modern bedroom suburbs tend to be today, has little cause for 
community organization; neither does a community that has been largely 
subject to the administration of persons outside the community. When 
community problems subsequently arise, there is no latent structure of 
organization, no “fire brigade” that can become activated to meet the 
problem.  
A new town, a budding community, is much like a child; if it faces no 
problems, if it is not challenged, it cannot grow. Each problem successfully 
met leaves its residue of sentiments and organization; without these 
sentiments and organization, future problems could not be solved.9  
It is the intent of this article to examine the research done on disaster response, 
primarily in the United States, in the context of the six dimensions of social capital 
identified by James Coleman. While the cited research was not initially guided by 
these concepts, there are sufficient descriptive materials to make realistic inferences. 
 
OBLIGATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
There are two rather dramatic changes regarding obligations that occur in the 
emergency period. Pre-disaster “normal” community functioning is oriented toward 
achieving many different goals relating to work, family, education, and leisure. A 
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disaster situation changes things rather dramatically since now community 
resources may not be sufficient to pursue all goals. Taking two illustrations, while 
health and medical issues are always important, the disaster situation increases their 
priority, centering on attention to disaster “victims.” On the other hand, education 
(normally given a high priority), becomes less important; school buildings and 
school personnel can be utilized in ways related to caring for victims. In a sense, the 
pursuit of certain activities and obligations are reordered as to how they become 
relevant to disaster impact. This process can be referred to as the development of an 
emergency consensus.10 It provides a new and distinct ordering of priorities, in 
contrast to the seemingly random and competitive activities of pre-disaster 
community life. 
A second change can be seen as the expansion of the citizenship role. In “normal” 
times, the obligations of citizenship are quite modest, mostly centering around 
“housekeeping” norms relating to the maintenance of property, control of pets and 
children, making an appearance at neighborhood celebrations, exhibiting 
community pride at school athletic events, and participating in periodic elections. 
For some, the obligation may involve becoming a member of a volunteer fire 
department or providing goods and labor for events that support such communal 
activities. In most of cases, the costs of participation are minimal and even 
enjoyable. Disasters, however, create unknown problems (some even life 
threatening) and provide the opportunity for stronger identification with the 
community on the part of its residents. In effect, the obligations of citizenship are 
enhanced and the focus of activity is clarified. This provides guidance in sorting out 
the appropriate role behavior in response to the emergency. 
Because individuals play multiple roles, they have multiple obligations and 
expectations. In sudden-impact situations, it is likely that the initial set of 
obligations is conditioned by a person’s role at the time (the family role at home or 
the professional role at work). In some popular discussions of disaster, considerable 
interest has centered on the possibilities of role conflict: ways in which people were 
forced to choose between family-role obligations and disaster assistance. The general 
assumption has been that people abandoned their work roles, especially in 
emergency organizations. Research has shown that the image of roles as rigid and 
conflictual is less accurate than seeing roles as adaptive. Disaster situations often 
provide guidance on the importance of certain roles and obligations and highlight 
the lesser importance of other role obligations.11  
Individuals in a disaster context have the potentiality of playing many different 
roles: family member, neighbor, worker, and for everyone within the community, the 
citizenship role.12 For example, if a person engages in search and rescue activity, it 
might be done in terms of his or her specific role-obligation, or in relation to a more 
generic role as a “good” citizen. The felt obligation of the rescuer is, in large part, 
irrelevant to those rescued. Any disaster “victim” has a cadre of people who have an 
obligation to help; other family members, neighbors, workmates, or any other 
member of the impacted community.  
The importance of obligations and expectations is reflected in search and rescue. 
During the first period after disaster impact, search and rescue efforts are carried on 
primarily by other “victims” in the area; they seek and extract victims and take them 
to where they can receive medical treatment.13 When emergency medical personnel 
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arrive on the scene, they have to use the knowledge of neighbors to locate remaining 
victims and the members of the community continue to help in all phases of the 
rescue operation. Much of the rescue operation will be terminated when formal 
rescuers arrive. In the 1980 Italian earthquake, ninety-seven percent of the 
entrapped and injured victims evacuated and transported to medical care were 
rescued by bare hands and shovels, not heavy equipment.14 This illustrates the 
importance of social networks. Of those who were trapped and living in single-
person households, forty-six percent were rescued, as compared to sixty-one percent 
of people living in multiple households. People living in single households 
experienced a death rate 2.4 times higher than those living in households with one or 
more of the household present. Michael LeChat suggests that, given the usual delay 
in the arrival of external rescue teams and equipment, there is a need in earthquake-
prone areas to educate local communities in rescue procedures, particularly since the 
longer a person is trapped, the higher the mortality rate.15  
An excellent study of search and rescue following a gasoline explosion in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, in which victims had been buried alive and rescuers were near 
them, comments on these findings: 
People did not participate in the search and rescue efforts at random. Instead, 
their participation was a function of the strength of their preexisting social 
linkages and interdependencies with the victims and fellow rescuers. Their 
search and rescue efforts were part of a stream of ongoing social relations in 
which people participated, and from which their activities on behalf of their 
relatives, friends, acquaintances, or even strangers obtained meaning. The 
rescuers prioritized life; all human life was precious for them but the lives of 
those socially closest to them were deemed more important.  
The chances of people surviving the blast were directly proportional to the 
presence among the searchers of a person or persons who cared for the victim 
and who knew the victim’s likely location at the time of the blast.16 
Even the decision to seek medical help on the part of the victims is not necessarily 
obvious. A study of a sample of tornado victims in Edmonton, Alberta indicated that 
while 15.3 percent of the victims made that decision themselves, family and friends 
made 28.6 percent of the decisions. While 19.4 percent of the respondents did not 
know how the decision had been made, only 26.5 percent of the decisions were made 
by some ‘official’ source. In addition, about forty-five percent of the victims were 
provided transportation to medical attention by family, friends, and others; about 
the same percentage were transported by official means (ambulance, in the car, or by 
a casualty bus).17  
In other contexts, family obligations continue to be important. “When people 
evacuate, they commonly do so as group members – most typically the group is a 
family unit. This means that evacuation planners at any level of government must 
explicitly recognize the social webbing and seek to design plans that complement it, 
rather than neutralize it.”18 When families evacuate, where do they go? Some studies 
show that up to eighty-five percent prefer to go to relatives and friends, rather than 
to public shelters.19 That preference to stay with friends and relatives is reinforced by 
invitations offered by kin. A study of the May 1980 eruption of Mt. Saint Helens 
indicated that almost thirty-five percent of the evacuees were contacted first by 
someone at their evacuation destination.20 All of this suggests that behavior during 
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the evacuation phase is prefigured by normal daily routines and action choices are 
guided by obligations that existed prior to the disaster situation.21  
In a study of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which used a sample of the entire 
city population, ten percent of respondents indicated that they left their homes in the 
year after the earthquake; eighty-six percent went to relatives and another five 
percent went to friends. Of the people included in the study, 11.2 percent indicated 
they had temporarily sheltered relatives or friends in their own homes sometime 
during the year following the earthquake.22  
While the previous examples emphasize the importance of family and 
neighborhood obligations, there is another source of obligations that are reflected in 
what we called earlier the expansion of the citizenship role. Residents feel obligated 
to participate in actions that will reduce the threat to other members of the 
community, even if family and other relatives have not been directly impacted by the 
disaster. A disaster occasion is characterized by a significant number of volunteers 
who become involved in a wide variety of assistance activity. Media depictions of 
volunteer activity often imply that the outpouring of volunteers is a consequence of 
“failure” on the part of organizations to mobilize regular employees. Or volunteers 
are seen as an interesting, but not very significant, source of help; at times, the 
reliance on volunteers is seen to support the argument for increased external help. In 
the Mexico City study cited above, there was an opportunity to ascertain the extent of 
volunteer activity and the ways in which volunteers had become involved. About ten 
percent of the sample indicated that they volunteered immediately after the 
earthquake. Such a percentage may seem small, but given the population base of 
Mexico City (one of the largest urban areas in the world) ten percent represents over 
2,000,000 people – certainly a significant volunteer response.  
Most of these volunteers either engaged in search and rescue or helped in the 
procurement and processing of supplies. Nearly half indicated that they had worked 
four days or longer, and almost eighteen percent had worked ten days or more. In 
terms of daily time commitment, forty-five percent said they had worked an average 
of nine hours a day. The volunteers were not just from the areas of the city 
immediately affected by the earthquake, but from all over the city; people who had 
no direct family or kin ties to the victims. This significant volunteer response 
occurred within the context of an estimated loss of less than two percent of the city’s 
housing stock. Among our sample, only 5.5 percent suffered considerable damage to 
their housing, plus disruption of all utility services.  
The volume of volunteers often creates a different type of problem for emergency 
managers. Instead of anticipating the lack of volunteers, a more important problem 
emerges: how to make the most effective use of the volunteers in realistic emergency 
activities. (Some community organizations will have extensive experience in utilizing 
volunteers in other situations.)  
The importance of obligations and expectations as a form of social capital in 
disasters can be stated negatively in the following way. Socially isolated individuals 
are less likely to be rescued, seek medical help, take preventative action (such as 
evacuating), or receive assistance from others in the form of shelter. Conversely, 
existing social networks provide effective search and rescue in removing victims, 
helping them to seek medical attention, and providing transportation to medical 
help locations. The same social networks provide motivation and encouragement to 
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take preventative action, such as evacuation, by their willingness to provide 
temporary shelter as well as longer-term housing assistance. These same social 
networks are the channels that motivate volunteers to provide labor for important 
disaster-related tasks, which compensates for losses in physical capital.  
 
INFORMATIONAL POTENTIAL 
The role of informational potential as social capital can be identified in several 
different aspects of disaster behavior. Certainly, one of the universal observations 
regarding emergency situations is the increased need for information and the actual 
increase in information: The increase does not necessarily fit the need. When 
situations change, and a disaster is a classic case of a sudden change in reality, both 
individuals and social units need new information to orient their actions. For social 
units representing the community, this may mean “damage assessment” of what 
actually happened. Prior to impact, individuals may need to gather information for 
preventative action. Again, social networks provide the channels whereby individuals 
develop a perception of risk and are motivated to take some type of preventative 
action.  
To illustrate this point, both warning and evacuation will be discussed in the 
context of information potential. There have been times, in certain situations, when 
“officials” have been reluctant to issue warnings based on their assumption that 
“people” would panic. In addition, evacuation has at times been discussed as a 
“failure of will” on the part of citizens who were trying to avoid some kind of threat. 
Fortunately, those assumptions are increasingly rare. But there are still troublesome 
assumptions, on the part of emergency managers, that the best way to warn people is 
to provide “official” public information through the media. This is based on the 
assumption that individuals will watch television or listen to the radio, hear the 
official warning, and consequently take the recommended action. Research-based 
descriptions of the warning process and effective evacuations underscore ways in 
which the “public information” imagery is likely to fail, however, and show how 
social capital is an important element in effective action. 
In examining the research base on warning and response, Colleen Fitzpatrick and 
Dennis Mileti outlined the process in five different steps: hears, understands, 
believes, personalizes, and decides/responds.23 Each of the stages is interactive and 
independent of individualistic mental stages. Other people help you “hear”; not 
everyone watches the media all the time. Others help you understand and believe; 
people still talk to one another. Others help personalize the message, pointing out 
that the general message actually applies to the current situation, and then assist in 
discussing appropriate action. Research has shown that if protective action is not 
taken, there is an effort to seek additional information. That is, the process is 
iterative. As Fitzpatrick and Mileti point out: “People respond to warnings through a 
social psychological process...which persons in an endangered public do and do not 
hear, understand, believe, personalize, and respond to emergency warnings is not 
the result of chance.”24  
Ronald Perry has developed a model to understand how people comply with an 
evacuation plan in a sample of three different disaster models. He underscores the 
importance of the social nature of the warning process, emphasizing the importance 
of warning-source credibility and the way in which warnings are confirmed by other 
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people; he also considers the content of warning messages. Perry notes, “The three 
events studied here represent comparable events in that each involved some 
forewarning and was characterized by definable speed of onset, duration of impact, 
and scope of impact.” He adds, “the idea that the same model will predict evacuation 
behavior in connection with a flood, a volcanic eruption, and a hazardous materials 
incident, calls into question the popular strategy of classifying research on disaster 
events in terms of the type of event (e.g. Natural versus Manmade).”25 Perry also 
includes family context in his model since evacuation is not individualistic; families 
evacuate as a group or, when missing members, only when those missing members 
are determined to be safe (although in Perry’s samples, no family member was 
missing at the time of evacuation).  
The importance of social networks for informational potential can best be 
appreciated when there are failures to take protective action. One such example, 
described by B.E. Aguirre, examined the conditions whereby the community of 
Saragosa, Texas was not provided tornado warnings. Saragosa, an unincorporated 
town in Southwest Texas, had a population of 428, and there were twenty-nine 
known deaths from the impact of the tornado. The community, comprised almost 
entirely of residents of Mexican-American descent, was part of a geographically large 
county.  The description of the possible path of the tornado in warning messages was 
difficult to identify in familiar locational terms for those in the community. A major 
element in the warning’s failure was that almost the entire community watched 
Univision, the national Spanish television network, which did not provide localized 
weather information. While some local radio stations did provide some warning 
messages, there were difficulties in making distinctions, in Spanish, between a 
tornado watch and a tornado warning, and the weather conditions immediately prior 
to the tornado provided few clues of the impending danger. As a result, the 
population of Saragosa did not receive the official warning messages, because their 
own social networks were isolated linguistically and geographically from the Anglo 
networks. 
The importance of social networks as information potential is not undermined by 
the presence of several social networks within the same community. Certainly one of 
the key tasks of emergency managers is to understand the plurality of networks and 
how they might require different channels to convey important messages rather than 
assuming that a single media source will reach a mass audience and that all groups 
within the community will be part of that mass. This issue will become increasingly 
important since the 2000 census points to the growing diversity in the U.S. 
population; both television and radio address an expanding number of diverse 
audiences, reflecting distinctly different social networks. Returning to Fitzpatrick 
and Mileti’s formulation of the warning process, if people do not hear, it is 
impossible for them to understand, believe, personalize, or decide and respond. 
 
NORMS AND EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS 
Effective norms constitute a powerful form of social capital. This form of social 
capital facilitates certain actions and constrains others. Allan Barton suggested a 
series of relationships between a disaster event and the emergence of altruistic 
behavior that continues to have considerable face validity.26 Examples include: (1) 
The higher the proportion of victims and the average loss, the more communication 
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and knowledge there will be about the losses suffered by the victims; (2) When 
informal social connections are strong within a population, the sufferers are more 
likely to be more salient as a reference or identification group; (3) Social randomness 
of impact influences beliefs about the causes of the suffering; (4) The more 
communication and knowledge there are about the losses suffered by the victims, the 
more people will feel sympathetic towards them; (5) The greater the informal social 
connectedness of the community, the higher the percentage of members with 
opportunities to help victims; (6) The greater the proportion sympathetic to the 
victims, the more people will actually help the victims. 
These propositions suggest that many disasters produce the optimum conditions 
for the development of altruistic norms. Disasters are relatively free of ideological 
disputes about cause, which tend to reduce channels of communication. If impact is 
sudden and creates socially random damage, this makes for greater saliency of 
sufferers as a reference group. All these conditions combine to create obligations to 
help and to emphasize helping as a community norm. The widespread perception of 
the community norm increases the actual behavior of helping. 
In addition to the conditions that provide normative support for helping behavior, 
the development of an emergency consensus, mentioned earlier, provides a ranking 
of values and suggests that care for victims and the restoration of routine community 
services should assume high priority while education, leisure, and non-critical work 
efforts can be set aside until the higher priority goals are achieved. In addition to the 
effort directed toward high priority goals, there is a reduction in enforcement of what 
is seen as inappropriate norms for the situation. For example, conventional norms, 
which enforce appropriate work dress, are ignored; coats are replaced by jackets and 
dresses are replaced by slacks. In addition, certain conventional bureaucratic norms 
are abrogated – expenditures that require two signatures are made with one; 
meetings based on appointment are replaced by meetings based on need. In all of 
these actions, there is a greater informality and less attention to status. (In fact, one 
indication of the end of the emergency period is when such norms are re-sanctioned 
again.)  
There are two situations that deserve mention here since they are, seemingly, 
attempts to sanction appropriate disaster behavior. First is the admonition 
frequently made by emergency officials in the media urging people not to panic. 
Second is the reassurance coming from various agencies that these agencies are 
doing “everything” to prevent looting. Both of these repetitive themes, accentuated 
during the emergency period, suggest that panic and looting are frequent and 
problematic in these situations. Research suggests otherwise, although this review 
centers on conclusions.  
Panic describes a condition of acute fear coupled with flight. While extremely rare, 
it can occur when certain conditions are present – when people are aware of a 
specific threat to themselves, perceive they are entrapped, and are isolated from 
others – producing feelings of social isolation. These conditions are rarely found in 
disaster situations.27  Many “victims” do have some anxiety and, in certain situations, 
flight may be a very appropriate response, especially if it is an evacuation.  
It is obvious that the admonition not to panic is sometimes an expression of 
“macho” ideology. At other times it is an official message designed to encourage 
behavior an agency might desire, rather than letting individuals decide for 
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themselves, regardless of the “official” plan. In any case, such admonitions have little 
effect in curbing behavior that probably would not occur anyway. On the other hand, 
the belief that panic is a widespread response to disaster can be self-destructive if 
officials are reluctant to issue warnings and alerts because they fear citizens will 
panic if informed about potential risks. Otherwise, the ritual of reminding others not 
to panic is as effective as parental warnings to be good.  
A second situation deals with the strong media focus on various efforts to prevent 
“looting.” Such reports seem to suggest that looting is widespread and problematic 
during disasters. The concept of looting conjures visions of an invading army, but the 
evidence suggests that looting is a rare occurrence in natural disasters. Nevertheless, 
the image of disasters followed by the looting of property persists.28 The primary 
explanation for this discontinuity – between popular conceptions and the absence of 
evidence for the behavior – centers on appropriate norms regarding the proper use 
of community resources after a disaster. 
Property has reference not to any concrete thing or material object, but as a 
shared expectation about what can or cannot be done with respect to something. 
Property thus is a type of social relationship – a shared understanding about who 
can do what with the valued resources in a community. These understandings are 
widely shared and are embedded in legal norms indicating the appropriate use, 
control, and disposal of valued resources within the community. Those norms 
change radically in what are seen as wide-spread emergencies; the concern for 
property norms are reflected in the fear of looting. In this, the fear may be real but 
the behavior is infrequent or absent: 
In natural disasters, in American society at least, there quickly develops a 
consensus that all private property rights are temporarily suspended for the 
common good. In one way, all goods become community property and can be 
used as needed for the general welfare. Thus, warehouses can be broken into 
without the owner’s permission to obtain generators necessary to keep 
hospitals functioning, and the act is seen as legitimate if undertaken for this 
purpose even though in a strict sense the participants might agree that it was 
technically an act of burglary. However, the parties involved, the local legal 
authorities and the general public in the area at the time of the emergency do 
not define such actions as looting and would react very negatively to attempts 
to impose such a definition.  
On the other hand, there is very powerful social pressure against the use 
of goods for purely personal use while major community emergency needs 
exist. In a way, the individual who uses anything for himself alone is seen as 
taking from the common store. The new norm as to property is that the 
affected group, as long as it has emergency needs, has priority.29  
In both of these instances, panic and looting, there are convictions that such 
behaviors are both common and problematic. Perhaps the only way to resolve this 
contradiction is to see these convictions – that people behave badly in disaster – as 
symbolic sanctions for “appropriate” behavior in disaster, the recommended 
etiquette for unusual circumstances. Such concerns are symbolic reminders, not 
effective sanctions, aimed at preventing these behaviors from emerging. Again the 
preoccupation with preventing looting often leads to the allocation of security 
personnel to non-existent or trivial tasks. On the other hand, such an allocation is 
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likely to be successful since prevention is quite possible when the problems do not 
exist. Consequently, the concern for these issues following a disaster does not mean 
that they are, in fact, problematic, but rather that disaster provides the opportunity 
to celebrate the virtues of rational behavior and respect for property. 
Finally, there are two special circumstances worthy of note. First, a number of 
researchers have commented on the development of “disaster subcultures.” For 
example, Dennis Wenger has noted: 
...in fully developed subcultures, the local community may not even perceive or 
define the impact of a disaster agent as being “disastrous.” Some communities 
have institutionalized their mode of response to the point that they view such 
events as floods as simply nuisances or possibly even look forward to the flood 
period as a time of “carnival.”30  
Such subcultures arise in communities that have repetitive experiences with a 
particular agent so that the disaster occasion becomes a part of the annual calendar 
of community life. Norms-appropriate behaviors are already in place to cover the 
situation. Such subcultures tend to develop in communities where there is a 
considerable amount of instrumental knowledge based on previous experience.  
A second circumstance has come about through the adoption of emergency 
planning by emergency organizations, especially those in the public domain with 
disaster responsibility. In this instance, there is the development of norms applicable 
to emergencies, which remain “latent” in non-emergency times. These may involve a 
responsibility to monitor particular hazards, planning for work force reporting and 
shift extension, and mechanisms for communicating organizational information to 
employees. Many of these latent emergency norms are simply extensions of routine 
organizational activities. The sanctions for violating these norms in an emergency 
context are already embodied in the reward and punishment system of the 
organization. So the emergency norms are unique only in the sense of the timing of 
their implementation, but they are based on the pre-disaster structure of these 
organizations. The transition does not lack continuity and is rooted in familiarity.  
While disasters are frequently seen as situations of normative disorganization, in 
fact the social processes provide the conditions for priority and effectiveness. The 
development of the emergency consensus gives high priority to care for victims and 
the restoration of essential community services, and de-emphasizes other usual 
community activities so that human and material resources can be reallocated to the 
higher priority tasks. The conditions are such that altruistic norms are supported. 
Some of that support takes the form of rumors, moral tales, and stories that 
underscore appropriate behavior for the situation. The emphasis on, and spread of, 
emergency planning have provided guidance for appropriate behavior in emergency 




To treat authority relations as a form of social capital in disaster response seems 
paradoxical, especially when a conventional view of disaster is seen as the prototype 
for social disorganization, primarily from the loss of authority. This conventional 
view of the loss of authority during disasters has been the rationale for public policy 
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arguments for the necessity to create “command and control” structures as a central 
feature of emergency management. On the other hand, in American society in 
particular, there has always been a popular skepticism of authority of all kinds and a 
particular distaste for those who claim authority without any social justification. This 
suggests that it is difficult to create authority for special situations. It also suggests 
that most forms of authority relations continue as social capital in disaster and that 
other forms can be modified, adapted, and transformed to fit the particular 
circumstances. Consequently, it is useful to talk about authority relations in the 
context of family and neighborhood, community organizations, and the community 
as a social unit. 
 
Family Authority 
As has been suggested in the discussion of obligations and expectations, family 
authority does not break down. In fact, family units continue to make allocative 
decisions as to how family resources are used. For example, in search and rescue 
efforts, family members can be “released” to assume certain disaster tasks while 
others take on additional family duties; a husband and wife may become involved in 
search and rescue efforts while assigning the oldest child or a grandparent to deal 
with childcare during that time. Too, it is quite common for certain emergency roles 
to be filled by families rather than individuals. A wife may have responsibilities to 
open and maintain a shelter operation for evacuees, while her husband and children 
deal with the shelter’s day-to-day maintenance; children might be moved out of their 
bedrooms to house relatives whose houses have been damaged. These are all 
allocative decisions on how to use family resources, made within the usual family 
authority structure and through the usual decision processes. None of these 
decisions can be “mandated” by the community and none of them is planned or even 
anticipated, but they occur and constitute social capital. None of the activities 
violates or changes previous family authority.   
 
Organizational Authority 
Existing community organizations carry most of the burden of disaster response. The 
pattern of organizational involvement has been well documented by what has been 
observed in a variety of disaster occasions.      
       
Figure I 
Pattern of Organizational Involvement 
  STRUCTURE TASKS  
 Regular Non-regular 
Old Established Type I Established Type III 
New Established Type II Established Type IV 
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Four types of organization reflect two dimensions: structure and tasks. Some 
organizations perform the same tasks in disaster response that they normally do, but 
others take on new activities. Too, some organizations function with the same basic 
relationships among members during the disaster response than they had 
previously. In other cases, totally new structures emerge. By cross-tabulating the two 
dimensions (structure and tasks), four different types of groups can be identified.31 
Using that typology, the implications for authority relations can be assumed. For 
example, established organizations (Type I) become involved in disaster response 
with the same authority relationships that existed prior to their response. A Type II 
organization continues with the same authority relations, but with expanded size and 
volunteers with previous involvement in the organization (and thus knowledge and 
some experience with the normative authority structure). Type III organizations 
have a pre-disaster existence, but extend their activity by dealing with realistic 
disaster tasks. This might be exemplified by a construction company that becomes 
involved in debris removal or a church group that takes over responsibility for a 
temporary feeding operation. While there are new tasks, the pre-disaster authority 
relationship continues. These personnel constitute a group rather than individual 
volunteers and, in their actions, they maintain their pre-disaster structure.  
The only type not to have a pre-disaster history is the Emergent Organizations 
(Type IV). While there is a considerable literature on emergence, there has been little 
direct attention given to issues of authority relations.32 One of the most complete 
descriptions of a work crew that emerged in the aftermath of a tornado is Louis 
Zurcher’s discussion of the social psychological functions of ephemeral roles.33 In 
that description, Zurcher emphasizes the development of a division of labor among 
the participants and the emergence of group solidarity. His description suggests that 
an emergent group that develops around an “immediate” need in the post-disaster 
environment is very task-related and the focus is on the division of labor necessary to 
accomplish those tasks. His description focuses on the process of differentiation; the 
work groups dissolved prior to any attempt to institutionalize and insure their 
continuity. 
It is important to note that the different organizational patterns also have 
different combinations of social capital.  For example, Type I organizations enter the 
emergency with homogeneous relationships – bonding relationships that strengthen 
the social capital that exits prior to the emergency period.  On the other hand, Types 
II and III are usually a mixture of bonding and bridging relationships. Type IV 
emergent groups link parts of the community structure together, a linking necessary 
for the new tasks at hand. Such linking may have been unnecessary prior to the 
collective cooperative response.  One consequence of this activity is to strengthen the 
identity of members of the community under crisis.  
The pattern of involvement indicates that authority relations within organizations 
provide the social capital necessary for the overall emergency response. Authority 
relations do not have to be reworked in the disaster context and the return to the 
pre-disaster authority context is usually an easy transition. Emergent groups, 
however, constitute a newly-created form of social capital for dealing with newly- 
created and unanticipated problems. These groups tend to be task-oriented and the 
relationships within the groups tend to be based on an emergent division of labor in 
which authority relations are built on function rather than status.  
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Community Authority  
There is a widespread perception, especially by the media, that there is confusion 
and disorganization within the community authority structure immediately after 
disaster impact. Such a perception more accurately describes a “natural” process 
whereby the community is able to achieve coordination of the many necessary tasks, 
some of which are new to previous community experience. In the early stages of 
disaster impact, there is uncertainty as to what has happened and urgency to act – to 
do something – on the part of community members. Mistakes may be made. Some 
organizations may allocate considerable resources to obvious, visible problems, 
which might not be central, given a more inclusive view. Some may over-mobilize, 
resulting from members wanting to do something. Others may find it confusing that 
volunteers are already doing tasks that organizations see as their exclusive province. 
Some organizations may find that they cannot “work” until another organization 
finishes its tasks. For example, one cannot transport injured people to the hospital 
until roads are cleared (what some call sequential interdependence).  
These problems begin to be solved with efforts to coordinate community activity. 
Coordination is often a by-product of the search for information and leads to the 
development of a coordinating locus within the community (usually centered in the 
local government) that has come to terms with priorities.34      
In this process of developing coordination, organizations with pre-disaster 
legitimacy continue. Police deal with social order and traffic. Fire departments deal 
with fire and other safety problems. Public Works departments deal with utilities 
and road problems. Hospitals and medical personnel deal with the injured. While 
some organizations might find themselves working with segments of the community 
for the first time in a new relationship, even emergent groups are an amalgam of pre-
disaster authority relations rather than something completely novel.  
In fact, the basis for the emergence of coordination of disaster tasks within the 
community is the pre-disaster authority structure. Thus, it is an important form of 
social capital. While some organizations may not be disaster relevant and may not be 
involved, others may play roles more important than those of their pre-disaster 
status. But the basic structures of the organizations that deal with the health and 
welfare of the community maintain their importance during the emergency period. 
In many ways, the priority of disaster-related tasks makes decision-making more 
rational. And one can argue that such decision-making is more effective than the 
diffuse and individualistic decision-making norm in the pre-disaster situation. In 
any case, the authority structures within families, within community organizations, 
and in the community as a whole generalize from their pre-disaster patterns and 
serve as the base for the community effort in the emergency period. They do not have 
to be changed or radically modified. Continuity is the dominant theme and 
familiarity is a consequence.  
 
APPROPRIABLE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
 One result of a reordering of community priorities, as reflected in the emergency 
consensus, is that not only are certain tasks given high priority, but other activities 
are assigned low priority in the overall emergency needs. This means that many 
community members can be allocated disaster tasks, which can greatly increase the 
DYNES, SOCIAL CAPITAL    16 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
available work force. Two forms of this reallocation of social capital are more 
common: Type II Expanding Organizations and Type III Extending Organizations 
(See Figure I).  
Expanding organizations are designed to utilize volunteers who have previous 
contact with the organization. These individuals express their helping behavior 
through conventional social organization. They are members of or participants in an 
organization that has emergency responsibility in its charter and so has established 
plans that call for the addition of personnel to meet disaster needs. These 
organizations have a latent structure that is activated when emergencies occur. This 
latent emergency structure has, in its preplanning, already specified the necessary 
roles and relationships. When such a plan is activated, those who have positions in 
the emergency organization are notified by a call-up system or may report to assist 
simply by their recognition of the presence of conditions on which the plan is based.  
Such a system for channeling helping behavior is characteristic of most traditional 
emergency organizations, such as police and fire departments, civil defense offices, 
Salvation Army units, public works organizations, and local Red Cross chapters. A 
police department may have an auxiliary police unit that is activated under certain 
conditions. The norms that guide helping behavior already exist within the pre-
disaster organizational structure and, in addition, the volunteer is placed in 
preplanned social relationships. The volunteer fits into a rank structure within the 
auxiliary police unit, and the relation of the regular departmental authority structure 
has already been established. These structures allow for relatively efficient matching 
of personnel to tasks at hand in an emergency.  
The second form of social capital reallocation, extending organizations, can best 
be described as a group of volunteers or members of an organization that has no 
specific emergency-related purpose. Such groups may, however, be concerned 
broadly with community service and so, when a disaster occurs, see disaster-related 
activities as a logical extension of their previous orientation. The individual group 
member does not volunteer; the organization does. The member’s involvement is an 
extension of group membership. The behavior then follows pre-disaster patterns of 
social relationship, while new norms emerge, focusing group activity on new 
disaster-related tasks. 
Examples of extending organizations include a scout troop mobilized by the 
scoutmaster to act as messengers for an emergency operation center; a church 
building used as a shelter and staffed by church members, or a parochial school 
staffed by the parent-teacher association; or a Veterans of Foreign Wars post that 
assumes responsibility for feeding disaster workers. In all these instances, 
considerable personnel can be mobilized quickly and channeled toward tasks created 
by the emergency. In addition to personnel, such groups and organizations have at 
their command many other types of resources – buildings, supplies, money, and 
information. 
It is important to emphasize that the behavior of the two types of volunteers 
described above follows lines of already-established social relationships. These are 
not spontaneous, random acts of generosity on the part of isolated individuals; they 
are extensions of pre-disaster relationships. 
 
 
DYNES, SOCIAL CAPITAL    17 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
INTENTIONAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
One can find, in the historic record, specific occasions when central governments 
have been involved in disaster situations, often with immediate relief. Most of that 
involvement has been on an ad hoc basis; when the immediate tasks were finished so 
was the governmental responsibility. In that context, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 
can be identified as the first modern disaster because of the emergency 
responsibilities initiated by the early patterns of a central government.35 That has 
changed. E.L. Quarantelli, using the broader term of civil protection, suggests: 
As we enter the 21st century, civil protection has finally become explicitly 
accepted as a major governmental responsibility in practically every country in 
the world. At the national level, usually the relevant activity is quartered in a 
formal governmental agency, very close to but relatively rarely at the highest 
level such as a cabinet office.36  
In the United States, a bifurcated system developed whereby national security issues 
were the concern of a national civil defense system, but local offices of civil defense 
were primarily concerned with local disasters. In a study of local civil defense in the 
1960s by the Disaster Research Center, the following conclusions were noted: 
1.  The scope of disaster planning was broadened to include a wider range of 
disaster agents... 2. There was a decline in the assumption that preparation for 
a nuclear attack was sufficient planning for all types of disaster contingencies… 
3. There was a shift in focus of disaster planning from the emphasis on security 
of the nation to the concern with the viability of the local community.37  
 
The DRC report went on to say that in the 1970s, the local community civil defense 
offices varied considerably in the scope of the hazards with which they were 
concerned: 
Some are completely focused on planning and the associated task of dealing 
with nuclear attack. Others are primarily concerned with natural disaster 
hazards. Many are concerned with both but the degree of emphasis on one or 
the other will vary. A smaller number show a range of concern with a wide 
range of hazards –  man-made, nuclear, natural disaster, etc.38  
During the ‘60s and ‘70s new concepts emerged. There was considerable discussion 
of “dual use” – the idea that facilities could be used for both national security and 
local disaster problems. There was the notion that the focus should be on all hazards 
within the community and the idea of “comprehensive emergency management” 
(CEM) began to be seen as an increasingly important function of local government. 
In some states, divisions of emergency management were created. And, in 1979, 
federal agencies with disaster responsibility were combined and reorganized into a 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.39  
The development of FEMA into a functioning emergency management 
organization took a long time. Its development as a federal/state partnership was 
enhanced by pressures on the agency from states where major disasters occurred. In 
addition, concern for traditional nuclear and civil defense issues receded. During the 
first Clinton administration, a former emergency management director from the 
president’s home state began to restructure FEMA to deal with the full range of 
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policy concerns – from mitigation of hazards to disaster recovery. These concerns 
were severely truncated with the terrorist attack in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, a 
new presidency, and the incorporation of FEMA into a large new agency called the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).   
In general, this reorganization was made with the rationale of strengthening 
national security and addressing the threat of terrorism. In this transition, many of 
the assumptions coming out of World War II and the Cold War were revived and re-
institutionalized. The necessity for homeland security seemed to be predicated on 
the weakness of individual citizens and the fragility of our social structure, requiring 
the government to enhance its ability to “command and control.” The necessity of 
command and control has been revived and in general is based on a set of 
assumptions about what happens in emergencies, especially those caused by 
terrorist attacks. Specifically, the command and control approach: 
1. Assumes social chaos and dramatic disjunctures during the emergency. 
2. Assumes the reduced capacity of individuals and social structure to cope. 
3. Creates artificial social structures to deal with that reduced capacity. 
4. Expresses a deep distrust of individuals and structures to make intelligent 
decisions in emergencies. 
5. Places responsibility in a top-down authority structure to make the right 
decisions and to communicate those “right” decisions in official 
information to insure action.  
6. Creates a closed system intended to overcome the inherent weakness of 
“civil” society to deal with important emergencies. 
The vocabulary of “command and control” is reflected in the issuance of a national 
response plan in December 2004 in which, in describing the proposed organization 
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The national structure for incident management establishes a clear progression of 
coordination and communication from the local level to regional and national 
headquarters level. As illustrated in Figure 2, the local incident command structures 
(namely the ICP(s) and Area Command) are responsible for directing on-scene 
emergency management and maintaining command and control of on-scene incident 
operations.40   
 
Alternative Assumptions 
The first test of this “reorganization” in the United States came with Hurricane 
Katrina and was not reassuring. Perhaps the catastrophic scope of Katrina was not a 
fair test.41 On the other hand, it prompted every legislative body, every political unit, 
and every media outlet to offer criticism, and some of the suggestions were relevant.  
Such criticisms have reenergized the move toward standardization, 
bureaucratization, and militarization of emergencies in modern democratic societies.  
This movement will continue to inhibit the effectiveness of social capital and to 
maximize the ignorance of authorities regarding the dynamics of the resources of 
local communities. These issues will continue to be problematic. 
A much more realistic set of assumptions for emergency planning should center 
on “problem-solving” rather than command and control: 
1.  Emergencies may create some degree of confusion and disorganization at 
the level of routine organizational patterns, but to describe that as “social 
chaos” is incorrect. 
2.  Emergencies do not reduce the capacity of individuals and social structures 
to cope. They may present new and unexpected problems to solve. 
3.   Existing social structure is the most effective way to solve those problems.  
To create an artificial emergency-specific authority structure is neither 
possible nor effective. 
4.  Planning efforts should be built around the capacity of social units to make 
rational and informed decisions. These social units need to be seen as 
resources for problem solving, rather than as the problem themselves. 
5. An emergency, by its very nature, is characterized by decentralized and 
pluralistic decision-making, so autonomy rather than the centralization of 
authority of decision-making should be valued. 
6. An open system could be created in which the premium is placed on 
flexibility and initiative among the various social units, whose efforts are 
coordinated. The goals of efforts should be oriented toward problem 
solving, rather than avoiding chaos. 
 
Kathleen Tierney observed that the response to the September 11th terrorist attack 
was so effective because it was flexible: 
The lesson here is that the response to the September 11th tragedy was so 
effective because it was not centrally directed and controlled.  Indeed, it was 
flexible, adaptive and focused on handling problems as they emerged.  It was 
a response that initially involved mainly those who were present in the 
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immediate area where the attacks occurred and then later merged the efforts 
of officially designated disaster response agencies with those of newly formed 
groups as well as literally thousands of other organized entities that had not 
been included in prior emergency planning and that were not subject to any 
central authority.42  
An alternative model for emergency response, based on the utilization of social 
capital, would be to use what exists and to capitalize on the characteristics that 
emerge during the crisis, rather than to create an artificial set of norms and 
structures. The continuity and persistence of behavior and structure that 
characterize the notion of social capital are evidenced in the following ways: 
 
 Rather than interpreting emergencies as a direct break in experience, individuals 
tend to normalize threat, to define situations as normal, and to continue habitual 
patterns of behavior.  
 Rather than exhibiting irrational and abnormal manifestations of behavior,    
individuals exhibit traditional role behavior and maintain occupational and 
familial obligations. Irrational and anti-social behaviors do not, in aggregate, 
increase (in fact, they probably decrease). 
 Traditional social structures such as families maintain their viability and can be 
utilized to assume additional emergency responsibilities. For example, there is 
good evidence that almost all search and rescue activities are done by kin and 
neighborhood groups. In addition, there is evidence that warning messages are 
mediated through traditional social structures, rather than through impersonal 
media. There is also evidence that kin and neighborhood groups provide mass 
shelter for a large majority of affected populations and that planned mass shelter 
is useful only for a small segment of the population. 
 Rational social structures such as community organizations maintain their 
viability and can be utilized to assume additional emergency responsibilities. For 
example, traditional health care institutions carry out almost all emergency 
medical care. Health care offered by first-aid stations or by hastily-constructed 
emergency facilities tends to be ignored and rejected.  
 The way people define the situation and determine appropriate behaviors 
requires heightened, rather than restricted, communication. The command-
control model places great faith on “correct” information, officially decreed. What 
are officially defined as rumors to be controlled are actually part of the 
definitional process. Thus, messages and channels of communication need to be 
increased rather than restricted. 
 Rather than seeing self-initiated helping action as disruptive because such 
actions were not planned, it is more appropriate to see planned action as 
supplemental to self-initiated actions. 
 Rather than attempting to centralize authority, it is more appropriate to structure 
a coordination model. The fact that emergencies have implications for many 
different segments of social life, each with their own pre-existing patterns of 
authority and the necessity for simultaneous action and autonomous decision 
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making, indicates it is impossible to create a centralized authority system (that it 
is probably unnecessary). The centralization of authority is usually predicated on 
the image of disintegration of social life. The evidence points to a viability of 
behavior and the adaptability of traditional structures, suggesting that authority 
is more of a problem in the minds of planners than an actual problem of life 
under emergency conditions. Planning should focus on coordination and the 
development of communications, rather than the creation of authority. 
 
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR ENHANCING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The basic assumption relating to social capital is that the local social system is the 
logical and viable base for all stages of emergency action. Certain specific courses of 
action can be suggested as a guide to policy: 
1. Utilize a variety of mechanisms to increase community identification and 
collective responsibility. Enlist religious and other civic organizations to 
build disaster responsibility into routine messages about moral and civic 
responsibility. In particular, there is a need to remind the community that 
the greater the disaster, the more the community will have to depend on 
its own resources. Disaster memorials, anniversaries, and other civic 
occasions provide such opportunities. 
2. Involve civic organizations in planning activities. Develop an inventory of 
and knowledge about community resources, both people and materials. 
Encourage organizations to develop certain useful disaster skills. For 
example, groups with physical locations, such as churches, schools, and 
some civic organizations, might develop skills in running mass feeding 
operations, shelters, information centers, etc. Local contractors might be 
encouraged to have meetings discussing the latest information on search 
and rescue in high-rise building collapses. Certain community skills such 
as knowledge of first aid might be encouraged as an important attribute of 
civic responsibility. More specific guidelines should be utilized for those 
community members engaged in disaster planning. 
3. Utilize existing habit patterns as the basis for emergency action. To do this 
effectively, knowledge of the patterns of social life and their routines is 
essential. For example, in making plans for evacuation, it is best to utilize 
usual patterns, e.g. easily-designated and commonly-traveled routes.  
4. Utilize existing social units, rather than create new ad hoc ones. If families 
are the major point of resource allocation within the community, utilize 
that system. Much of the thought in American society is individualistic; 
much of the activity in emergency situations is family-oriented. 
Organizations running shelters should think in terms of family units, not 
collections of individuals. The same thinking should characterize 
evacuation plans. In addition, much governmental assistance is directed 
toward individual applicants. To modify that suggests radical change, 
which is unlikely, but there needs to be a constant reminder that the 
“people” come in social units and need to be accommodated that way. 
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5. Utilize the existing authority structure, rather than create new ones. The 
speed with which decisions are made can be increased more easily by the 
use of a traditional structure than by the creation of a new one. The 
establishment of authority, which involves not only power but the 
acceptance of that power, takes time and is not easily or quickly reversed. 
It is better for outsiders to supplement local leadership than to assume  
locals are incompetent and incapable or outsiders are wise and competent. 
6. Utilize existing channels of communication and increase them, rather than 
restrict and narrow them to “official messages.” Information about 
potential risk, potential threat, and potential preventative action are not 
disorganizing; the lack of information, in the quest for certainty, may be. 
Any effective emergency plan is based on the autonomous and 
independent decisions of many to take appropriate action. These actions 
are more effective when communication is enhanced than restricted. 
Remember that people talk to one another, so these interpersonal 
channels should be used in addition to the mass media. Citizens are at 
work or school, engaged in many different collective activities and are not 
attached to the mass media. Remember that members of minority and 
immigrant communities may not access the same communication 
networks that the “official” community utilizes. Some citizens may be 
socially isolated because of disabilities, age, illness, and geographical 
location. Attempts to reach these people can also utilize conventional 
methods of social capital. 
7. Since it is difficult for citizens or politicians to maintain interest in 
activities concerned with local risks, at least a minimum level of concern 
should be maintained by institutionalizing support for emergency 
management functions within local government. Encouragement should 
continue for training activities leading to the professionalization of the 
emergency manager. This task may be best supported at a national level. 
Collectively, training efforts should become an integral part of municipal 
services, which would require only a small part of the cost of current 
emergency services. This would mean the creation and cultivation of 
citizen lobbying for the initiation and continuation of such services, 
making them as routine as the functions of the police, fire, ambulance, and 
other emergency services. 
8. The aim of emergency planning is to move back to the “normal” as quickly 
as possible after a disaster. This means the restoration of commerce, the 
reopening of schools, and the reinstitution of usual community patterns. 
Inconvenience is more easily adapted to than absence. And the therapeutic 
process, both for individuals and communities, is enhanced by the 
reestablishment of habitual actions. 
9. The recovery stage should not be seen as the opportunity for massive (and 
directed) social change. Nor should possible mitigation opportunities 
during the recovery be implemented so as to drastically alter the 
traditional social structure of the community. This does not imply that 
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there are no opportunities for mitigation during the recovery period; it 
suggests these opportunities be approached with humility rather than 
enthusiasm. Mitigation efforts can be effective if adapted to local 
community practices. 
 
LOOKING BACK AND FORTH 
This article began as an effort to examine the utility of the concept of social capital 
when applied to the existing research findings relating to disaster response. This 
concept has the advantage of moving away from a current preoccupation with 
hazards as a cause of, and mitigation as a solution to, disasters. It has the advantage 
of shifting attention away from making the environment sustainable and looking at 
how social systems can function in any environment. The concept of social capital 
has the advantage of seeing social systems as active resources, not passive victims, 
shifting the focus away from human vulnerability toward an emphasis on human 
capability. It has the advantage of identifying the creation of social resources in 
emergency situations, rather than focusing primarily on the destruction of physical 
capital. In these respects, the concept of social capital shows considerable promise. 
Moving back to disaster-related topics, there are a number of possibilities where 
social capital theory might be helpful. First, emergence here has been treated, mostly 
implicitly, as indicating the creation of new social capital. It would be useful to 
examine the literature on emergence, scattered through the disaster literature, to 
examine the outcome. Second, social capital theory might be useful in an analysis of 
the problems of external aid in disaster since such aid disrupts existing obligations, 
distorts informational potential, and imposes new authority patterns. Third, social 
capital theory is useful in the way it links microanalysis with macro-analysis. Most 
psychological studies of disaster victims have focused on psychodynamic causation 
with borrowed concepts, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Such theoretical 
approaches have been largely unsuccessful. Since social capital theory links the 
consequences of individual action to social resources, such a linkage holds the 
possibility of explaining individual “trauma” and individual resilience to disaster. 
Conceptually, social capital theory can be useful in comparative studies, both at 
the community level and at a social level. It might be useful to examine communities 
that have persisted and grown in situations that are now seen as high risk, and have 
led to enduring disaster subcultures. More complex, of course, are historical and 
comparative studies. As Gregory Bankoff has suggested: 
Perhaps the whole notion of threat is so interwoven into the pattern of 
historical development and daily life that many aspects of culture perceived as 
distinctive have their origins, at least, partly in the need for collective action in 
the face of common dangers.43  
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